The True Story of High-Speed Rail in the U.S.

On Tuesday, at Philadelphia's historic 30th Street Station, Vice President Joe Biden and Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood announced a $53 billion initiative to realize their vision of high-speed and intercity rail in the United States. The appeal includes a $8 billion allotment in the FY2012 federal budget – which must be approved by Congress – and would build upon the momentum towards high-speed rail established in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and subsequent annual appropriations.

Not only does the initiative promise investment to support new and improved high-speed and intercity rail corridors, but introduces a new three-tiered classification for different types of passenger rail projects. In the initial rounds of passenger rail projects supported by ARRA and annual appropriations, too little clarification was made by the Obama Administration between true high-speed rail services and more conventional intercity rail options (RAIL Magazine has consistently identified the overall effort as improving high-speed and intercity passenger rail). As a result, opponents of passenger rail were more easily able to characterize the conventional intercity passenger projects supported by these investment streams – such as those in Ohio and Wisconsin that were terminated by new state-level leadership – as not effective uses of public investment. The new categories – Core Express (greater than 125 mph), Regional (90 - 125 mph) and Emerging (under 90 mph) – better define the expectations of differing passenger rail projects and should allow a more coherent justification of individual corridors.

Additionally, it is unlikely that the proposed investment stream would trade-off with support for more established modes of transportation, such as community and public transportation or they highway network, as Administration officials – including President Obama himself – have routinely stressed the importance of an integrated, connected network of mobility options. Connectivity with transit services to serve as the first and last mile links with high-speed and intercity passenger rail routes is essential to the success of such projects.

The prospects for Congressional approval for the initiative are dubious, given the reluctance of leaders in the House of Representatives to support additional spending of any kind, and for high-speed rail in particular. So, while the White House leadership on the issue indicates the strong and continued support of the Obama Administration, enthusiasm for the initiative should be restrained until a path towards Congressional approval becomes more apparent.

Reaction to the announcement was mixed, from strong endorsements from passenger rail advocates, business leaders (such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) and manufacturers – who noted the job-creation, connectivity and community investment benefits of such a campaign – to less positive reactions from Republican leaders, most notably House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Rep. John Mica (FL - 7th). Mica cited his long-standing disagreements with Amtrak, along with his continued push for high-speed rail investment in the Northeast Corridor (NEC).

Congressman Mica – one of the most knowledgeable and experienced transportation leaders in Congress, and one who will have a strong role in drafting new federal transportation legislation – should be commended for advocating policy ideas that offer no direct benefits to his constituents in Florida. Too few elected officials stake out ground on policy questions for the pure sake of the nation's collective good, which is the case with Mica's stance here. Moreover, he's absolutely correct that the NEC possesses the greatest potential for effective and successful true high-speed rail service of any high-speed rail corridor in the nation. This blog took extensive looks at both the history of the development of the NEC and Amtrak's NEC high-speed rail plan, which was released last fall.

However, the trouble with true high-speed rail in the NEC is its both astronomically expensive ($117 billion, according to Amtrak) and logistically challenging (requiring new tunnels, bridges, etc), leading to a completion timeline measured in decades, not years. Moreover, while Amtrak's recently-developed plan is a good first step, much more work needs to be done in developing a realistic approach to rights-of-way, station facilities, infrastructure and equipment, and many other elements. Among the key reasons why other high-speed rail corridors – namely those in California and Florida – were selected for initial investment through ARRA and annual appropriations were because plans for those networks were already developed, significant engineering work completed and property acquired. The NEC benefits from no such advance work as of yet, although the Gateway Tunnel recently announced by New Jersey's Senators – Lautenberg and Menendez – is the first tangible new infrastructure proposal for the corridor.

It is certainly possible that, should the $53 billion initiative supported by the Obama Administration be enacted by Congress, that investment for developing more fully-developed high-speed rail plans for the NEC would ultimately be selected. Nonetheless, since the Administration has billed their vision for high-speed and intercity passenger rail as a nationwide effort, it is likely that projects from across the country will continued to be selected, especially those – like Florida and California – that are closest to realization. Early success stories are needed to prove the concept of high-speed rail to the rest of the nation, and the NEC is far from that reality.

It is also important to consider the notion of how intercity passenger rail operates on conventional routes, namely those owned by private railroads. Congressman Mica routinely criticizes Amtrak as example of wasteful government spending and a hindrance to private sector competition, although he is certainly not alone in his criticism. And, to be fair, Amtrak is hardly a perfect instrument to achieve the nation's passenger rail goals. Its customer service is wildly inconsistent, station facilities range from breathtaking (the union stations in both Washington and Los Angeles, for example) to outright shabby (the scores of so-called Amshacks littered across the country), and its long-distance trains are chronically late and infrequent. At the same time, they're saddled with pension payments to retired employees of the freight railroads – many of whom never even worked for Amtrak – have ownership of only one true rail corridor (the NEC) and burdened by an often fluctuating and occasionally non-existent federal policy that guides their direction. Accordingly, to claim all of Amtrak's challenges are self-inflicted is irresponsible rhetoric. (In 2009, author James McCommons took an extensive look at Amtrak's history, trends and challenges in Waiting on a Train, and last year, we interviewed McCommons in RAIL #25, as well as including his presentation at our Connecting Communities: A Passenger Rail Symposium in Long Beach.)

At the same time, few leaders or policy-makers ever come to grips with the fundamental reality of most of the nation's passenger rail network: it operates over the rails of privately-owned freight railroads, which makes contracted service through private operators nearly impossible. Because of the 1970 Rail Passenger Service Act whereby the federal government allowed private railroads to shed their money-loosing passenger services and created Amtrak, the national passenger carrier has exclusive domain to operate passenger trains over their tracks. And while most freight railroads tolerate Amtrak as a nuisance which occasionally occupies their rails, they would have an even lower appetite for private entities with access to their rail lines. Amtrak service is predictable, legally-restricted and, essentially, equally unfair and painful to all the private railroads. Issues such as liability, contract compliance and new routes are well-established in governing documents and practice, providing low levels of uncertainty to the system. New entrants to the passenger rail arena – imagine Richard Branson bringing his Virgin brand to the U.S. rail network, or the rapidly-growing Megabus introducing Megatrain – would be independent agents and potential competitors, and offer none of the certainty and precedent as the more established Amtrak. For America's freight railroads, the devil you know is better than the devil you don't.

It is in this atmosphere that the recent – and likely future – rounds of non-high speed, intercity passenger rail projects were selected, with Amtrak as the service operator. While Amtrak might not be the ideal entity to provide intercity passenger trains, it is the only one that can currently navigate the freight-dominated railroad infrastructure. As true high-speed rail projects are developed – those with dedicated infrastructure that is separate from the freight rail network and where speeds over 125 mph are possible – opportunities for private sector involvement will become more prevalent. Indeed, Amtrak's role in the Florida high-speed rail project is only that of a prospective bidder – the railroad partnered with French operator SNCF to submit their proposal – competing along with other international firms and entities for the right to design, build, operate and maintain the system. A similar arrangement is anticipated in California, perhaps with an even greater amount of private, international investment to fuel the project to completion.

The Return of the EMU

Rendering of Denver's planned EMU vehicles

Over the past three or four decades, one important element of the passenger rail renaissance has been the rediscovery of the commuter rail mode as a vital aspect of regional transportation networks. We included an extensive look at these trends in commuter rail in the 12th Edition of RAIL Magazine, back in the summer of 2005. However, one component of commuter rail history did not evolve to the same degree as the rest of the mode in the recent past: the use of self-propelled, electrically-powered vehicles (electric-multiple units, or EMUs) to provide the service.


Now, it is understandable why EMUs were generally not part of a restored family of commuter rail operations. They're expensive to install, meaning the electric catenary infrastructure they require demands up-front capital, and the vehicles themselves are more costly than their diesel-hauled counterparts. At times when every budget line item in capital projects are scrutinized, its far easier to justify the less-expensive diesel-powered trainsets, especially as double-deck passenger coaches became more common to meet capacity needs.


Those systems operating EMU trains today are but a handful, and most of those are hold-over services originally built by the private railroads of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Metro North Railroad operates EMUs over all three of its routes in New York and Connecticut – all of which serve Grand Central Terminal in Manhattan – as does its Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) counterpart, the Long Island Railroad, over substantial portions of its system. Across the Hudson River, New Jersey Transit hosts EMUs on several routes, while nearly all the regional rail lines of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) feature EMU technology. North of the border, the Agence Metropolitaine de Transport (AMT) – serving the Montreal region – is one of the most recent adopters of EMU trains, which were deployed on its Deux-Montagnes line in 1995. Chicago is the only site of EMU operations west of the northeast – which sees the trainsets operate over its Metra Electric division – as well as the venerable interurban, the South Shore Line between South Bend and downtown Chicago. Interestingly, one of the newest systems in North America does employ EMUs: the Errocarril Suburbano de la Zona Metropolitana del Valle de México, which began service between downtown Mexico City and Cuautitlán in 2008.


Aside from those half-dozen or so commuter rail systems, the rest of North America is largely devoid of electrically-powered commuter trains. Even several commuter rail operations along the Northeast Corridor which could operate EMUs under Amtrak's catenary infrastructure – the Penn Line of Maryland's MARC Train, Connecticut's Shore Line East service and the Providence/Stoughton Line of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) – do not run EMU trains and have no formal plans to do so (although MARC Penn Line trains are often powered by electric locomotives, unlike the others in this set).  


Nonetheless, EMU technology does offer some significant benefits over diesel locomotive-based operations on the highest-capacity lines. Since a locomotive isn't hauling its own weight in addition to that of the trailing railcars and EMUs customarily don't power more than one additional coach, EMU trains are typically limited only by the length of the station platforms they serve and can achieve higher speeds than their diesel-powered counterparts. Moreover, for the same reasons, they are more energy-efficient while also producing more passenger revenue per trainset, since the passengers are – in essence – traveling in the locomotive itself. Lastly, EMUs produce no emissions directly from the vehicle, although the same is true for electric locomotives.


Mindful of this cohort of benefits, some current and future commuter rail systems are taking a fresh look at EMU technology and how it might be applied to their operations. The most likely to deploy EMU trains and infrastructure is the Eagle P3 Project in the Denver region. The project – a public-private partnership between the Regional Transportation District of Denver (RTD) and Denver Transit Partners – will build three new commuter rail lines serving Union Station in downtown Denver by 2016: the East Corridor to Denver International Airport (DIA); the Gold Line Corridor to Wheat Ridge; and a portion of the Northwest Rail Corridor to Federal Heights. All three projects will be electrified and operate EMU vehicles over their routes. Several renderings of potential EMU vehicles for the project have been developed (see below).

Along the same lines, plans are moving forward to electrify several of the existing routes of Toronto's commuter rail network, GO Train, as well as a spur route to Toronto's Pearson International Airport. To that end, Metrolinx – the transportation planning and policy-making entity in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA) – recently approved recommendations for an initial round of electrification that would see the current Lakeshore and Georgetown lines add electric power, along with the airport spur off the Georgetown line. EMUs are expected to begin operations on the airport route by 2018, with the other lines following afterwards (see proposed map below).

Alternatively, one of the longest-discussed electrification commuter rail projects has been that of the Caltrain service between San Francisco and San Jose. The route – one of the longest continually-operating commuter rail services in the nation – operates high-frequency service along the densely-populated corridor and is an ideal candidate for electrification. However, two factors complicate fulfillment of these plans, one short-term and the other long term. First, Caltrain currently faces severe budget shortfalls due to recent economic challenges and California's state budget crisis, and will likely be forced to cut service and raise fares to compensate. Hardly stable conditions to undertake such an extensive effort. Moreover, the corridor will likely be the location for the high-speed trains of the California High-Speed Rail network. Should the route be selected, it is likely the entire corridor will be rebuilt, including the electric catenary infrastructure required for high-speed rail. With that upgrade, Caltrain commuter rail service would mingle on the route along with high-speed trains and require complete electrification to share the tracks. While construction on the initial high-speed rail segment in California's Central Valley will begin within the next few years, the timetable for the project to reach the Bay Area is undetermined. 

In all, EMUs present notable operational and societal benefits as a result of their deployment, but require significant up-front capital to install their required infrastructure. Where the proper mix of demographics, rail corridors and investment are present, they should be studied as a valuable resource for both new and existing commuter rail operations.